

5th **INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON**
PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS
APPLICATIONS (PKIA 2024)

SEPTEMBER 5-6th, 2024

Advanced QKD Protocols and Practical Challenges


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Centre for Development of Advanced Computing - Bengaluru

Outline

- ◆ Motivation
- ◆ Quantum Cryptography
- ◆ Advanced Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
- ◆ Measurement Device Independent - QKD
- ◆ Twin Field - QKD
- ◆ Quantum Hacking
- ◆ Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) Integration
- ◆ Control Electronic Architecture
- ◆ Practical Challenges in Field Implementation






Prof. Richard Feynman



Quantum Cryptography

♦ Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a secure **Symmetric key** distribution technique whose **Unconditional Theoretical Security** is assured by the laws of **Quantum Mechanics**.



Measurement Device Independent - QKD

◆ It removes the Dependency from the Measurement Devices (Single Photon Detector)


Protocol

- **State Preparation:** Alice and Bob individually prepare a **phase randomized** weak coherent pulses(WCP) $|\sqrt{\mu_a}e^{i\theta_a}\rangle$ and $|\sqrt{\mu_b}e^{i\theta_b}\rangle$ with few different decoy intensities $\mu_a, \mu_b \in [\mu, \nu, 0]$.
- **Measurements:** Alice and Bob send their quantum state to the **untrusted** third party **Charlie** to perform the **two photon interference** measurement on their state.


$$|\psi^-\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[|01\rangle - |10\rangle]$$

Advantages

- ◆ Immune to all possible Detector based attacks
- ◆ A Star Type Network Topology
- ◆ Sustain with High Channel Loss
- ◆ Untrusted Nodes
- ◆ Practicality




2 Photon Interference



Twin Field - QKD


- ◆ The secret key capacity of a quantum channel sets an **upper bound** on the maximum extractable secret key, given by the **PLOB** bound...

$$R_{PLOB} = -\log_2(1 - \eta)$$



Advantages

- ◆ All the MDI-QKD Features
- ◆ SKR $R \sim O(\sqrt{\eta})$



- **State Preparation:** Alice and Bob prepare a **Twin like Quantum Optical Modes**.
- **Measurements:** Alice and Bob send their optical modes to the central **relay station Charlie**. At the central, Charlie observes the **Single Photon Interference**.



Quantum Hacking

Eavesdropper Strategy


- ◆ A **Weak Coherent State** can be described by a Mixture of **Fock states**.

$$|\alpha\rangle = e^{-\frac{|\mu|^2}{2}} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{\mu^n}{\sqrt{n!}} |n\rangle$$

- ◆ By **Measuring** and **Monitoring** the **Parameters** of the QKD system, the **Leaked Information** can be estimated.




Solution




- ◆ The **Imperfection** of the Practical devices leaves potential **Loopholes** for Eve to **SPY** the **Final Secret Key**.

Quantum Random Number Generator Integration



Heralded Single Photon Source

Beam Splitter




Bit 0

Bit 1



NIST Randomness Test

... .. 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Random Bit String

MDI-QKD Setup




FPGA Based Control Electronics



Experimental Results




Discrete Phase Randomization



Phase Encoding



Phase Randomized Optical Signal



Devetek-Winter Bound

$$SKR \geq \frac{2}{M} Q_{\mu} [1 - H_2(e_p) - f H_2(e_{\mu})]$$


Practical Challenges in Field Implementation

Photon Interference


- ◆ Perfect **Temporal Overlapping**
- ◆ **Polarization** need to be Identical
- ◆ **Phase** of an Optical Signals need to be Correlated

Phase Evolution


- A. Phase of an **Optical Source**
- B. Phase Introduced by **Optical Channel**



1. No Phase Post Selection (NPP) Protocol



2. Phase Post Selection (NPP) Protocol



Conclusion

- ◆ **Experimentally Generated a Phase Randomised Optical Signal (Initial Quantum State) using Weak Coherent Sources and Electro Optical Modulators**
- ◆ **Developed a Control Electronics Hardware Design based on FPG.**
- ◆ **Detailed analysis of practical challenges for field implementation.**

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THANK YOU